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cupation of Land Act (19 of 1998) (PIE). The MEC opposed 
their application and claimed they were not ‘genuinely 
homeless’and were not affected by the court order. 
The Madlala Village residents’ application to the High 
Court for leave to intervene was dismissed. No reasons 
were given by the Court. They then petitioned the Su-
preme Court of Appeal for the leave to appeal the High 
Court decision, but their petition was dismissed.
The Madlala Village residents then approached the 
Constitutional Court to determine whether the High Court 
erred in refusing them leave to intervene in the proceed-
ings
On 13 January 2014, the Constitutional Court admitted 
Abahlali baseMjondolo as an amicus curiae in the appeal.
The Constitutional Court decision
The main judgment was written by Zondo J, with whom 
Moseneke ACJ, Skweyiya ADCJ, Cameron J, Dambuza 
AJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, and Majiedt AJ con-
curred. The Constitutional Court found that the interim 
order authorised the Municipality and the Minister of Po-
lice, acting through South Africa Police Services (SAPS), to 
‘take all reasonable steps to prevent any persons from oc-
cupying, the Lamontville property’. This would amount to 
an eviction order (para 24–25 ). 
The Municipality argued that the interim order did not 
apply to people who were already in occupation of the 
Lamontville property before the order was granted. How-
ever, it was later established that the Municipality relied on 
the interim order for its authority to carry out demolitions 
on 13 February 2014, the day after the High Court hearing, 
on no less than 272 structures, 93 of which were half built 
and the rest fully built. As such the interim order was ef-
fectively an eviction order.
The Constitutional Court found that the Madlala Vil-
lage residents had a direct and substantial interest in the 
interim order proceedings in the High Court (case no. 
3329/2013) (para 29) as the interim order affected their 
interests adversely. It found that the High Court therefore 
erred in dismissing their application for leave to intervene. 
The general principle of law 
As far as evictions are concerned, Section 25(1) of the Con-
stitution states that no-one may be deprived of property, 
except in terms of a law of general application, and that 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation. Section 26(3) fur-
ther guarantees that, unless and until a court has issued an 
order after considering all the relevant circumstances, no 
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down judgment in the case of Jabulani Zulu and 
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Fact and procedural history
Jabulani Zulu and 389 other people (Madlala Village resi-
dents) lived in informal homes on a property commonly 
known as Madlala Village in Lamontville Township, Dur-
ban. In September 2012, the eThekwini municipality land 
invasion control unit came to the property and evicted the 
residents and demolished their homes. The Madlala Vil-
lage residents rebuild their homes soon after the control 
unit had left. The eThekwini municipality (the Municipal-
ity) carried out the evictions and demolitions without any 
court order. Subsequent to the demolitions in September 
2012, the control unit regularly patrolled the Lamontville 
property and demolished the Madlala Village residents’ 
shacks and homes, which the residents rebuilt on 24 occa-
sions after each demolition. 
The Municipality accused the Madlala Village residents 
of invading the Lamontville property in order to jump the 
queue of those waiting to be allocated houses, and point-
ed out that the Lamontville property had been earmarked 
for low-cost housing for a group of people who had already 
been identified (para 8).
The High Court
In March 2013, the Member of the Executive Council for 
Human Settlements and Public Works, KwaZulu-Natal 
(the MEC) sought and obtained an interim order from the 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court (Koen J) (case no. 3329/2013) 
restraining any persons from invading or occupying vari-
ous properties that had been allegedly been earmarked 
for low-cost housing or were being developed (namely, 
37 provincial housing department properties, presumably 
across 1,568 properties in total (para 58)), including the 
Lamontville property (para 10). In April 2013, the MEC and 
the Municipality approached the High Court to confirm the 
interim order. 
The Madlala Village residents applied to be joined in 
the High Court proceedings as interested parties since 
they were subject to the interim order. They argued that 
the interim order sought by the MEC affected their proper-
ty and therefore they had a direct and substantive interest 
in the proceedings. Further, they argued that the interim 
order authorised their eviction without compliance with 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Oc-
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one may be evicted from their home or have their home 
demolished, and that no legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions. PIE governs evictions to ensure the most vulner-
able are protected. Section 4 of PIE prescribes some cir-
cumstances that have to be taken into account when an 
eviction of unlawful occupiers is carried out. Sections 4(6) 
and 4(7) specifically provide that a court hearing an evic-
tion application ‘may grant an order for eviction if it is of 
the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after con-
sidering all the relevant circumstances, including the rights 
and needs’ of the most vulnerable, such as the elderly, chil-
dren, disabled persons and households headed by women.
Minority judgment
A separate judgment by Van Der Westhuizen J, with which 
Froneman J concurs, agrees with the main judgment that 
Koen J’s order is an eviction order that contravenes the 
protections in PIE, but goes further to find that it is unlaw-
ful and unconstitutional. Van der Westhuizen focused on 
the constitutionality of the interim order. He contextual-
ised the matter squarely: in the ‘country’s history of colo-
nialism and apartheid, dispossession of land and gross dis-
crimination, as well as prevailing poverty and inequality, 
issues around housing are central to our constitutional de-
mocracy’ (para 43). Further it was noted that the Madlala 
Village residents ‘live in abject poverty [and] the interim 
order strips them of protection for the very little they have’ 
(para 58).
He noted that the interim order was issued without due 
consideration of the impact it would have on the Madlala 
Village residents, who had nowhere else to live, which was 
in contravention with the provisions of PIE, and the under-
lying constitutional rights. The interim order was therefore 
unlawful and unconstitutional because it negated their 
rights under PIE and section 26(3) of the Constitution. PIE 
particularly offers protective measures that are intended 
to ensure due process and sufficient consideration of hous-
ing needs prior to an eviction order being issued.
Van Der Westhuizen further pointed out that since 
this was not an isolated incident, it was necessary for the 
Constitutional Court to ‘establish legal certainty on orders 
like the interim order’ (para 50). This is based on the legal 
principle that ‘even where an issue does not have immedi-
ate impact on the parties’ positions, a court may deal with 
an issue if its immediate resolution will be in the public 
interest’ (para 51). An example of immediate resolution 
that was considered to be in the public interest was in Ra-
dio Pretoria v Chairperson, Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa and Another [2004] ZACC 24, at 
para 22; and Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others [2009] ZACC 8, at para 40.
The interim order is squarely a constitutional matter 
dealing with Madlala Village residents’ rights not to be 
arbitrarily evicted from their homes as guaranteed under 
section 26 of the Constitution. The Court also considered 
whether irreparable harm would result if leave were not 
granted (para 56). If irreparable harm cannot be shown, 
the request to appeal an interim order will generally fail. 
(See also Treatment Action Campaign (2002) para 12.) The 
Madlala Village residents alleged that each time their 
shelters were dismantled by the Municipality’s control 
unit, the materials which had built their homes and shacks 
(informal structures) were either taken away or destroyed, 
‘stripping them of the very little they had, including their 
homes’.
Significance of this case
This case is significant because the Constitutional Court 
established that an interim order had been used as an 
eviction order. The Court noted that the interim order was 
crucial to the fate of the Madlala Village residents because 
it did not require the municipality to follow PIE, which re-
quires that certain steps be taken before people can be 
evicted. As such the Court unanimously held that inter-
im order issued by the High Court was an eviction order, 
which was unacceptable. Madlala Village residents were 
granted leave to intervene in the High Court proceedings.
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